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Young populations, and particularly young males, have been attributed a proclivity to 
aggression and unrest that puts societies at risk. Theories about the dangers of a 
demographic ‘youth bulge’ inform public and policy debates about the predictors of 
violent conflict, as evidenced most recently in the World Bank’s World Development 
Report for 2007. This paper evaluates the validity and utility of claims linking youth 
bulges to civil conflicts by reviewing different literatures concerning naturalist ideas 
of young humans’ innate aggression and cognitive incompetence as  well as 
environmentalist ideas of environmental stimuli, processes of socialisation, and the 
dialectical relationship of structural conditions and human agency. This review finds 
that the moral panic propagated by youth bulge theorists is too often based on only 
one form of influence on human development and action, whether an aspect of 
environment, personal experience, or individual traits. A more cogent analysis must 
integrate the highly complex and dynamic processes involved in cognition and 
behaviour and aim to develop theories that take account of the social power, 
ideational and structural forms, and emotional and cognitive processes that young 
people experience and draw on in times of war. Theories of causality that fail to 
account for this complexity obscure understanding of the many ways in which young 
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I. Introduction 
In an alarmist and very troubling article published in October 2003, British MP 
David Willetts,
i makes the bold assertion that the young - children, adolescents and 
youth  -  instigate most of the political and criminal violence throughout the world 
today. He reasons that the most turbulent countries globally are ‘wrestling with the 
social consequences o f dramatic demographic change…’ as ‘they can’t handle 
youthfulness’ (Willetts 2003: 18); the nations with the youngest populations being the 
ones most likely to collapse into a state of war. Willetts echoes concerns raised by 
others (Cincotta, Engelman and Anastasion 2003, Huntington in  Steinberger 2001) 
and in making his case, draws on statistics developed by The Center for Strategic and 
International Studies in Washington, DC:  
Of the world’s 25 most youthful countries, 16 have experienced major civil 
conflict since 1995. And this is not a new phenomenon….Iran’s median age when 
the Shah was deposed was 17. What do Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Pakistan all 
have in common now? They all have a median age of under 19….among 
countries with the oldest populations, only Croatia has been involved in conflict 
over the past 15 years. (Willetts 2003: 18) 
 
In other words, it is suggested not just that where the young constitute a large 
percentage of the total population there is a ready supply of young  people for 
recruitment, but more importantly that a high critical mass of youth is in itself a 
predictor of armed conflict. Some even contend that there exists a clear point beyond 
which communities  reach a ‘critical level’  prone for violence (Huntington 1 996, 
Mesquida and Wiener 2001 and 1999). Such claims centre on the idea that young 
humans, and specifically young males, have a special proclivity for aggression and 
unrest.  
 
Following the September 11
th 2001 attacks on the US, global security  fears 
have  dramatically raised the stakes of research on both urban unrest and armed 
conflict. Military psychology, sociology, history, demography, international relations, 
political economy and political science have between them developed a veritable 
industry of scholarship tracking causes and trends in war, and the motives for and 
patterns of terrorist activity and other forms of political unrest. In an environment 
pervaded by fears of world disorder, research centres and think tanks like The Center 
for Strategic a nd International Studies have successfully obtained the ear of 
politicians, military and security personnel, policy analysts and the public at large. By 
firmly linking young humans – especially young men - with violence against states, 
war researchers and commentators have the potential to instil a sense of moral panic 
as the ‘youth bulge’ in parts of the South is seen to pose a grave threat to local, 
national, regional and even global security (Glenn 2004, Helgerson 2002, Hendrixson 
2004, Kaplan 1994, Sommers 2006 and 2003). As Henrik Urdal  observes,  ‘youth 
bulges have become a popular explanation for current political instability in the Arab 
world and for recruitment to international terrorist networks’ (Urdal 2004: 1). This 
sense of panic is heightened by the frequent use of intemperate language that implies 
mass calamity, as in a report by The Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, 
which describes the phenomenon of child soldiering as a ‘post-Cold War epidemic’ 
(Borchini, Lanz and O’Connell 2002).  
 
As someone who has long researched young people’s social competencies and 
responsibilities within the family, workplace and society more broadly, my intuitive QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS138  Page 3 
  3 
reaction to these doom-laden prophecies has been to dismiss them as both a gross 
exaggeration and a distortion of reality. My reservations have been heightened by the 
irresponsible way that statistics are bandied about in much of the research and public 
debate. For example, it is clearly quite ludicrous to talk about child soldiering as an 
‘epidemic’ on the basis of speculative UN figures indicating that the world’s military 
arena at present contains a mere 250,000 combatants and support personnel under the 
age of 18 (United Nations 2005). In fact, it has been suggested that in most places 
other than sub-Saharan Africa, the number of child soldiers is decreasing (Kelley nd), 
and that even in sub-Saharan Africa the evidence for marauding hordes of alienated, 
angry and aggressive youth simply does not exist (Sommers 2003).  
 
Nonetheless, however precarious some of the statistical data and overstated 
some of the claims, recent research does seem to indicate empirical backing for the 
argument linking young people with unbridled violence in war, raising a number of 
important questions about causality. These questions focus on the nature of young 
humans, their experiences and capabilities as social actors and their socialisation, as 
well as on trends in inter-generational relations and societal structures more broadly. 
In this article I focus particularly on young people in middle childhood and 
adolescence and attempt to address these questions through a review of the major 
explanatory models provided in the literatures of several disciplines.  
 
II. Demographic Drives 
Limitations of the model 
The World Bank’s World Development Report for 2007 takes as its focus 
young people (between the ages of 12 and 24) in developing countries. In a section 
entitled ‘Do large youth cohorts cause violence? Maybe, if economics growth rates 
are low’, the report summarises the arguments presented above and concludes that 
‘the risk of civil conflict for countries in the early or middle phases of their 
demographic transition may be heightened by an interaction of demographic factors 
with each other and with nondemographic factors.’ (World Bank 2006: 166) While 
the report does not explicitly endorse or reject the hypothesised causal link between 
‘youth bulges’ and violence, its inclusion of this hypothesis is indication of the social 
power of this notion. Indeed, we might regard the report’s ambiguity concerning the 
effects of youth demographics as tacit acceptance of the theory’s merits.  
 
The social power of recent demographic data notwithstanding, my first 
question concerns the validity and utility of claims linking youth bulges with civil 
conflicts. This question turns out to be a difficult one to answer. To begin with, it is 
not always clear what is meant by ‘youth’ in terms of the age and generational cohort 
under consideration. One of the proponents of the demographic argument, Samuel P. 
Huntington, maintains that ‘Generally speaking, the people who go out and kill other 
people are males between the ages of 16 and 30’ (Huntington quoted in Steinberger 
2001). Others, for instance Urdal (2004) and Braungart and Bruangart (1986), follow 
the official UN definition of ‘youth’ which refers more narrowly to young people 
between the ages of 15 and 24. A lack of conceptual or statistical alignment has the 
potential to play havoc with the debate, especially where large data sets are involved, 
since contributors are not always discussing the same phenomenon. To be fair to the 
demographers, much of the conceptual confusion is not of their making but created by 
others who have chosen to interpret their work very loosely, for example by 
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tendency is apparent in public commentary as exemplified in this instance by Willetts’ 
(2003) article which conflates young people in Europe who engage in street violence 
and are often well below 16 years of age with young combatants in the majority world 
who may be as much as 30 years old.  
 
Another difficulty with building a case on the demographic evidence is that 
while the statistical data can be significantly correlated with a range of factors, and as 
such, many of the analyses have very limited explanatory reach in terms of causality. 
Urdal’s (2004) useful review of the assumptions underlying much of the research in 
this field makes this limitation abundantly clear. For instance, Urdal finds no evidence 
to support Huntington’s claim that a youth bulge above a given critical level is a key 
predictor of civil conflict. Similarly, he tests the assertion that youth rebellion is 
incited by grievances (Collier 2000, Collier and Hoeffler 2001) due to inequality, 
political exclusion, ethnic dominance and similar such factors, finding that it is not 
born out by the evidence, which points far more directly to opportunity than injustice. 
Urdal establishes that availability of financing, military advantage and opportunity 
costs associated with male secondary education enrolment, per capita income and 
growth rate all have statistical significance, as does absolute population size.  
 
The trouble is that even if Urdal’s model has greater explanatory power than 
do many others, his conclusions are at such a high degree of generality that they cease 
to be very useful as a means of understanding the motivation in human behaviour.
ii  
Statistical modelling has the potential to miss significant causal factors merely 
because some phenomena cannot adequately be tracked through quantitative methods. 
For example, it may be that with proportionally fewer experienced adults in a 
population, the familiar social constraints and practices that act against the 
involvement of the young in political violence break down, but the question is: how 
would one test for this statistically?  
 
Possibly more critical, however, is the use of the age criterion in demographic 
research to demarcate social categories and, related to this, the arbitrariness and very 
broad span of the age thresholds applied to the youth cohort. Outside the narrow 
context of school and formal places of work, chronological age is rarely a determinant 
of social categories and in many societies people do not celebrate their birth date and 
are not even aware of their age. The imposition of external interpretive frames of this 
nature becomes especially problematic when scholars try to attach emic meanings to 
them. Marc Sommers (2003: 1), for example, writes about youth in Africa as ‘a 
demographic majority that sees itself as an outcast minority’. Similarly, Paul Richards 
and Krijn Peters note that regardless of which combatant faction Sierra Leonean youth 
were associated with ‘all tend to share membership in an excluded and educationally 
disadvantaged youth underclass’ (Richards 1996: 174). And, as Urdal notes and also 
dismisses, there are those who claim that youth violence is an expression of a 
‘collective generational consciousness’ (Braungart 1984). 
  
In practice, the age thresholds for youth utilised by the UN and by 
demographers are likely to have no social meaning whatsoever in the war-torn 
societies that are the object of investigation. This renders questionable claims that this 
demographic majority takes political action on the basis of a collective consciousness 
of itself as an outcast minority.  Moreover, if the demographic data are to be used to 
explain the involvement of boys and girls in middle childhood and adolescence in the QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS138  Page 5 
  5 
violence of war, they need to be far better disaggregated. Such disaggregation is 
especially important in gauging the causes of violence in the young because it is very 
likely that significant structural (or generational), experiential and developmental (or 
life course) differences exist between different age cohorts, these in turn producing 
different motives and opportunities for fighting in war.  
 
III. Existential Crises 
Adult inventions 
Given that much of the statistical evidence about rebellion and violence 
against states implicates youth, my second question is whether adult concerns also 
encompass children and adolescents. If so, do such concerns reflect lived reality? Or 
are they a figment of the adult imagination? In an article focusing specifically on 
violence in middle childhood, in this case the kidnapping and killing by two young 
boys of British toddler Jamie Bulger, Allison James and Chris Jenks (James and Jenks 
1996) maintain that there is considerable historical momentum underlying the present 
moral panic about the young in Western industrialised countries, with very real 
consequences in terms of the conceptualisation and interpretation of the issues.  James 
and Jenks ascribe the shock and outrage sparked off by this incident to the idealisation 
of children and childhood in late modern Euro-American society. They maintain that: 
‘…the murder was not just disturbing, but was, quite literally, unthinkable. 
Unthinkable, that is, because it occurred within the conceptual space of childhood 
which, prior to this breach, was conceived of – for the most part and for most children 
– as innocence enshrined’ (ibid: 315). They explore the historical origins of this 
reification of childhood, tracing the chief criteria that have come to characterise the 
dominant conceptualisation. They suggest that in modern times: ‘(1) …the child is set 
apart temporally as different, through the calculation of age; (2)… the child is deemed 
to have a special nature, determined by Nature, (3) … the child is innocent; and (4) 
therefore is vulnerably dependent’ (ibid: 318).  
 
From this analysis James and Jenks conclude that ‘regarding children as being 
in possession of a special and distinctive nature, which is both untainted and 
vulnerably dependent, is what makes any link between children and violent crime 
particularly problematic, for the imagery of childhood and that of violent criminality 
are iconologically irreconcilable’ (ibid: 320). They advance the analysis by arguing 
that through the passage of modernity the child ‘came to symbolize futurity and was 
thus guarded and invested’ (ibid: 324). Hence, ‘ any assault on what the child is, or 
rather, what the child has evolved into, threatens to rock the social base’, this 
provoking an existential crisis in late-modernity (ibid: 324). Finally, through their 
review of the media coverage and other popular representations, they claim that the 
Bulger case gave rise to two alternative explanations concerning what causes children 
to kill. The first affirmed early Puritan thinking which held that young humans are 
born sinful, with a natural propensity for evil, and hence if not properly trained and 
constrained are liable to spiral out of control (ibid: 321). In the second, the child 
murderer is viewed as a transgressive, anomalous creature, a composite child-adult 
that deviates from the accepted norm of childhood (ibid: 323).  
 
While the James and Jenks article enables us to contextualise and better 
understand inflammatory views like those of Willetts, I would take issue with their 
conclusion about the historical and cultural specificity of these ideas. I have in fact 
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reports from other parts of the world, including contexts where distinctive socio-
historical constructions of children and childhood prevail. Young people’s 
involvement in political violence and insurrection invokes emotions in adults that run 
very deep, in some cases parents even expressing doubts about their own children. I 
first came across what I have described elsewhere as a ‘residual fear of children’ in 
Cambodia in 1995 during a study conducted with Sara Gibbs on the social effects of 
the genocidal Pol Pot regime . Even though our field visit took place two decades 
after the collapse of the regime, adult respondents would frequently comment that, 
‘the children now are terrible, they have no respect for the traditional beliefs’ and, 
children today are ‘bad’, ‘disrespectful’, ‘violent’, ‘out of control’. They would 
express grave concern about adults’ lack of authority over and inability to control the 
young. When asked about why this should be, they would refer to the terrible and 
inexplicable events that took place during Pol Pot’s time and to the crucial role of 
boys and girls in these.  
 
Scholars and commentators have observed similar discourses in several of the 
war-torn countries in Africa, although it is not always clear whether these discourses 
refer to children, adolescents or youth. Describing the inter-tribal conflict between the 
Dinka and the Nuer and between these tribes and Sudan’s northern centralist Islamic 
state, Jok Madut Jok   highlights how adult Nilotes ‘…define their interminable 
sufferings as a product of collapsing morality among the youth’. He cites the 
surviving remnants of the ‘red army’ who in the late 1980s were rounded up by the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and marched to south-western Ethiopia to 
enrol in  United Nations High Commissioner for  Refugees (UNHCR)-supported 
schools, most eventually being forcibly inducted into the SPLA, as the most acute 
example of inter-generational breakdown of communications among contemporary 
Nilotes: ‘The end result is a socially-isolated community of armed youth who have 
been brutally trained not only to kill on command but, also, to torture whomever their 
military superiors designate.’ (2005: 7). He observes that the endless state of war in 
southern Sudan has eroded even the bonds between parents and children.  
 
Likewise, writing about Sierra Leone and citing Abdullah et al. 1997, 
Bangura, 1997, Fanthorpe, 2001 and Richards, 1994 and 1996, Susan Shepler 
comments that ‘many have sought to understand this war as a  ‘crisis of youth’’ 
(Shepler 2004: 26). In her view adult anxieties about child soldiering in Sierra Leone 
are not, as in the industrialised countries of the West, focused on the loss of childhood 
innocence but on the separation from family and family socialisation and the idea that 
the nation faces the loss of a generation. Stephen Ellis similarly argues that signs of ‘a 
crisis of youth’ have been apparent in West Africa for some time, with Sierra Leone 
presenting the most extreme case. He notes that ‘In many of the civil wars of the 
1990s both local and foreign observers have detected an element of youth out of 
control, adolescents and even children who, in societies with strong gerontocratic 
traditions, seize power by force’(ibid: 11). By way of explanation, he comments that:   
…sharpening generational cleavages of value and perspective are recognized by 
just about everyone…much of the cultural knowledge and historical experience 
accumulated by the senior generation has been deemed irrelevant by disrespectful 
youth, ‘who have gone crazy with all the smoke and the sound of guns’. (Ibid: 7)  
 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS138  Page 7 
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Childhood realities 
From these accounts it is clear that the violence of young people in war is 
troubling to adults not simply because of the terrible suffering it causes but also 
because it is seen to foreordain societal disorder more generally. This perception calls 
up parallels with adult reactions to childhood criminality in industrialised countries 
like the UK. But it would be a mistake to exaggerate these parallels since clearly there 
is a major difference of scale, for while it is very rare for children in Britain to kill, in 
societies in conflict young boys and girls are sometimes rendered the prime 
instruments of violence and terror. In Cambodia, for example, children and 
adolescents fast became Pol Pot’s foot soldiers, its torturers, its workers and its spies, 
policing family and community life and leading the relentless marches through the 
countryside that killed so many civilians. Children and adolescents have been 
similarly prevalent among troops in many, if not most, of the recent wars in Africa. 
This suggests that an existential crisis around children, childhood and adolescence in 
war-torn societies cannot be adequately explained in terms of irreconcilable 
iconologies, anomalous social categories, or even perceived disorder in inter-
generational power relations.  
 
The conflicts in Africa and Cambodia bring to the fore another particularly 
ominous feature of the human experience of violence, this being the evidence 
(sometimes no more than anecdotal) that in war children and adolescents can be and 
have often been far more brutal than adults. This was a focal issue in a recent seminar 
on child soldiers organised for US Marines by the Center for Emerging Threats and 
Opportunities (CETO). In one of the presentations Major Gray, a Royal British 
Marine, observes that: 
They [children] fight in a very disjointed way. The egocentric nature of children, 
the fact that when a child is a child, they don’t have the ability to think about 
other people. They have a simple one-step requirement that they fulfil. As you get 
older you understand about morality. They kind of fight like this. On a 
playground, they are harsh to each other, They fulfil their own needs all the time. 
You give them an AK-47 and it’s a whole different story. You combine the fact 
that they are on drugs, you give them a weapon, and they behave as if they were 
on a playground, and it is terrifying.’ (Borchini, Lanz and O’Connell 2002: 18)  
 
In the same vein, child rights advocate Jo Becker describes how ‘on the 
battlefield, children more readily follow orders, are less inhibited, and are more 
vicious than their grown-up counterparts. They seemingly have no fear, acclimatize 
quickly, and often do not play by the rules’ (ibid: 14).   
 
In these passages Gray and Becker conjure up a number of images of the 
young that have a distinctly elemental air about them. They depict children as: 
flouting the rules, being fearless, uninhibited, disjointed; driven by drugs and 
egotistical needs; vicious, harsh and lacking in empathy; and without complex 
reasoning ability. Ingeniously, Gray juxtaposes the image of the playground with that 
of the battlefield: the former a legitimate site of childhood socialisation, a carefree 
place of joy; and the latter, a place of great brutality and suffering where children 
apparently have no rightful role.  In these assertions and in this imagery there are 
several naturalist assumptions about child combatants, assumptions that pervade many 
contemporary accounts of war. Such thinking is rendered all the more compelling by 
frequent reports of children’s involvement in acts of  seemingly irrational torture, QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS138  Page 8 
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maiming, killing and cannibalism during war. Many of these atrocities have been 
committed against the most defenceless members of society—the very young or the 
very old for example—or against close family members.  
 
Do we need to theorise young people’s violence? 
Writers in the human rights and applied research traditions have in recent 
years produced a large number of works on child soldiers, with many more in the 
pipeline . Often part of advocacy campaigns, these volumes have had a noticeable 
influence on humanitarian policy and practice as well as on political and public 
perception. This literature does not perceive the need to theorise children’s and 
adolescents’ violence, for the actions of young people in war are understood quite 
simply as the result of acts of commission or omission perpetrated by adults.  
 
Picking up on the image of the young as innocent and vulnerably dependent, 
children are held in this literature to be bearers of a range of specified, universally 
ordained and guaranteed rights due to their status as immature beings. Chief among 
these rights are a safe, healthy and carefree childhood, provision and protection from 
violence and other infractions. According to this view, war is an a nathema to 
childhood, a flagrant violation of children’s rights. Boys and girls who fight are in 
effect stripped of their agency, in that their enlistment decisions are not thought of as 
based in the exercise of free rational choice (Brett and Specht 2004). Their 
participation in the violence of conflict is conceived of as due to the intercession of 
adult agents whose purpose it is to coerce, deceive, exploit or otherwise take 
advantage of the young: 
Children are often forced to commit atrocities, such as killings, mutilations and 
rapes. Even if not actually forced, they may be induced to commit them, for 
example, by being primed with drugs and/or alcohol, being offered money or 
other material rewards, or simply being encouraged by the desire to please adult 
commanders, or being seduced by the sensation of power. (Brett 2000: 9) 
 
Coercion of children is undoubtedly an abiding feature of many modern wars, 
most likely where military units confront serious manpower shortages or there is a 
rapid build up in hostilities, for the young offer ‘a quick, easy, low-cost way of 
generating forces.’  (Borchini, Lanz and O’Connell 2002: 14)  And groups that 
otherwise would have no real military power can pose a significant threat by 
augmenting their ranks with boy and girl soldiers.
iii Even if coercion does play a 
significant part, though, the question is whether conceptualising child soldiering 
solely in terms of adult culpability and adult infractions is adequate to the task of 
explaining children’s apparent predilection for violence.  
 
The anecdotal evidence before us, however patchy or subjective, obliges 
scholars to engage in further examination of possible causes of youthful violence, not 
least because better understandings and better explanations are needed in order to 
lessen suffering. Below is a summary of what I take to be some of the key 
conceptualisations, theories and assumptions in this field. 
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IV. Causes and consequences: naturalist models 
Animal drives   
Over thirty years ago Samuel Kim observed that ‘Practically all the significant 
theories of war and peace in Western political thought have been postulated either 
implicitly or explicitly on  certain images of human nature.’ (Kim 1976: 253) The 
most powerful of these images is of a ‘vicious and cruel animal with no compassion 
for his fellows’ (ibid: 254). Such images draw directly on naturalist thinking of the 
kind advanced by Konrad Lorenz (1966) in his theory that aggression and war in 
humans is phylogenetically programmed and by Sigmund Freud (1930) in his claim 
that aggression is one of the most primordial of all human instincts. The ideas of 
Lorenz and Freud have been much challenged since they were first framed, provoking 
a long-standing and impassioned debate about whether aggression in humans is innate 
or learned. This debate hinges on the extent to which human action can be regarded as 
governed by basic drives that are shared with other animals or by processes that are 
presumed to be unique to the human species and a product of human cultures, 
experience, and related functioning.  
 
Freud’s assertion was that aggression is due to an inborn human tendency to 
destroy, an instinct that is normally directed outward at others. Konrad’s belief was 
that aggression is innate, immutable and inevitable, a basic drive that has developed 
gradually  through evolutionary adaptation. From a bio-evolutionary or socio-
biological perspective aggression is understood as a functional trait necessitated by 
competition over scarce resources. Aggressive behaviour ensures the survival and 
reproduction of the most successful (strongest and fittest) individuals in a species and 
the transmission of their traits to succeeding generations. According to Roy 
Baumeister and Brad Bushman (2004: 208), the fact that in all cultures young men are 
always the most physically aggressive group corroborates the biological basis of 
aggressive behaviour. These authors do not find convincing the counter-claim by 
feminists and social constructionists that the aggression of young males is learned 
through socialisation. 
  
Bio-evolutionary and biosocial explanations have been heavily criticised for 
their biological reductionism. Kim condemns the reification of ‘instinctive’ drives as 
if their import and scope for influencing human behaviour were self-evident (Kim 
1976: 257). He argues further that clinical and laboratory experiments have proved 
the dichotomy between instinct and learning to be misleading, observing that ‘even 
‘instinctive’ behaviours operate against a complex tangle of interaction which 
includes other genes as well as the influence of the environment’ (ibid: 257).  Both he 
and Jacques Lizot and Sarah Dart  emphasise the problem of building a theory of war 
on individual behaviour. For Kim, inter-group behaviour and inter-group  violence 
cannot be equated so readily with the inter-personal, while Lizot and Dart maintain 
that as ‘a complete social event’ (ibid: 846) war is ‘effectuated in the framework of a 
vast system of communication in which all social and political interactions are 
regulated’ (ibid: 859). Kim also points to studies of soldiers in combat that have 
revealed their reluctance to kill. Such research concludes that the aggressive urge to 
fight tends to be far less commonly felt than individual self-interest; this being 
expressed on the battlefield as ‘fear, concern for safety and survival, homesickness, 
anxiety for family welfare back home, job dissatisfaction and boredom’ (Kim 1976: 
265). 
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Innate aggression in children 
Several scholars have tested the nature assumption through research on the 
development of aggression and pro-social behaviour in children (Landers 1991) and 
adolescents (Cole, Cole and Lightfoot 2005). Psychologists (for example, Erikson 
1982, Marcia 2001) have often theorised that the major developmental task during 
adolescence is the growth of an independent personal identity and it would seem as 
though this process is in some way  being  linked with  an apparent tendency to 
heightened aggression. It was in the early 1900s that psychologist and educator G. 
Stanley Hall    first  proposed the idea that adolescence is a time of  particular 
turbulence. Hall regarded the instability and anguish that he  thought  of as 
characterising this life phase  to be a necessary precursor to the subsequent 
development of adult equilibrium  (Durkin 1998:  515). Ethologists and socio-
biologists are also of the view that some aggression during adolescence is functional, 
since conflict with elders is thought of as allowing the young to spend more time with 
peers, which in turn is part of realigning their status prior to entry into adulthood . 
 
The problem with using this  kind of  reasoning to explain young people’s 
violence in war, though, is that the adaptive advantage of childhood or adolescent 
aggression on the battlefield is far from self-evident. Indeed, until they have passed 
through puberty at least, children’s physical immaturity and state of development 
would appear to be more a source of vulnerability during combat than of strength. For 
example, adolescents require inordinate amounts of sleep and adolescent boys in 
particular have poor physical coordination, both behavioural patterns being counter-
indicative for good performance in war. As well, serum testosterone levels in male 
adolescents, one of the presumed precursors to negative emotional disposition and 
aggression, do not reach anything like adult levels until the later stages of puberty . In 
fact, when it comes to bio-evolutionary theories of human behaviour, they seem to be 
more aptly labelled theories of adult male aggression than of human aggression more 
generally, as others have noted (Lizot and Dart 1994). 
 
Over the years, research has challenged the idea that adolescents are inherently 
troubled and rebellious (Durkin 1998,  Hauser and Bowlds 1990,  Larson and 
Lampman-Petraitis 1989, Rice 1990). The question is: does this mean that biological 
assumptions about the nature of the young have no place in explaining violence in 
children and adolescents?  Even if we seek to avoid biological determinism, i t is 
probably unwise to ignore biological influences in aggression altogether, since there 
undoubtedly are some fundamental universal imperatives in human behaviour. 
Although beyond the scope of this review, I would imagine that were neuroscience to 
address the violence of the young in war it might have a great deal to contribute to 
this discussion, since it should be able to tell us whether it is the forebrain or the 
midbrain that is engaged during such activity. 
 
Cognitive incompetence  
While many naturalist accounts emphasise basic animal drives in youthful 
violence, other theorists in the naturalist tradition imply a more decisive role for 
cognition.  Developmental psychology has played a particularly important part in this 
discussion. Stage theory has long been one of the most influential paradigms in this 
discipline, the idea that human development progresses through uniform stages first 
appearing in European  literature in medieval times (Shahar 1990). This idea was 
transformed into global scientific wisdom in the 20
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influence of Jean Piaget, whose research on child development and cognition has had 
major impact in many fields and disciplines. Piaget was concerned about child 
development in the broader sense and did not seek to explain how children engage 
with the extremes of environment or experience. Nevertheless, his perspectives on 
child cognitive development continue to permeate both scholarly and public 
understandings of children in war, despite the fact that many psychologists have gone 
on to challenge some of his central assertions. 
  
Piaget’s seminal work (1932) on cognition and its subsequent refinement by 
Lawrence Kohlberg (1976) have had a major impact on research into children’s moral 
understandings and their political thought and action. Piaget drew a direct link 
between children’s wrongdoing and their moral reasoning, emphasising both 
children’s active nature in constructing moral principles and the importance of intent 
in their ideas about moral transgression. His basic premise was that human 
competence, functioning and growth are subject to universal forces of change which 
are linked most fundamentally to the human life cycle and ageing process. Thus, he 
found children’s views on transgressions and their ideas about authority, justice and 
the like to differ markedly from those of adults, and hence emphasised how these 
views changed significantly during the course of development. He maintained further 
that these changes follow an ordered and irreversible sequence of cognitive stages, 
each one of which has certain defining features and developmental expectations, 
builds on the accomplishments of the previous stage and is largely immune from 
environmental influence. He believed that moral knowledge and reasoning in 
particular are based in the development of higher cognitive functions, especially the 
capacity for objective, rational thought and social experience.
iv 
 
What relevance does this perspective on moral reasoning have for scholarly 
understandings of children’s behaviour in war? If one can assume that there is a 
relationship between politico-moral or socio-moral reasoning and the character of 
behaviour, this kind of thinking provides a basis for hypothesising what drives 
children to engage in extreme violence. By emphasising rational, complex thought as 
a higher cognitive function, Piaget and Kohlberg in effect set a lower age limit on 
children’s ability to employ politico-socio or socio-moral reasoning in their actions. 
By arguing that the young enter into advanced thought comparatively late in 
childhood, the suggestion seems to be that children have only a tenuous grasp on 
moral judgement. Hence, children are presumably regarded as not having fully 
internalised the regulations governing accepted behaviour and thereby as more liable 
to take part in ‘mindless’ atrocities, as follows: 
One of the hallmarks of maturity is that the individual progresses from 
unquestioning obedience to external authority to a state of moral autonomy. Rules 
and values become internalized, social norms are accepted as one’s own, and 
conscience …now comes to determine choices between alternative courses of 
behaviour. (Schaffer 1999: 302-3). 
 
Indeed, Kohlberg held that there is likely to be greater consistency between 
moral reasoning and conduct in individuals who have reached a higher level of 
cognitive maturity. This kind of argument has encouraged researchers to enquire into 
the link between deficits in social cognitive skills and aggression in children (De 
Rosier et al 1994; Dodge, Pettit, McClaskey and Brown 1986; Kendall and Braswell 
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powers of hypothetical reasoning  might  provide a basis for contemplating and 
articulating alternatives to the status quo, this process leading them into conflict with 
adults (Durkin 1998: 523). In this way, stage theory has perpetuated a common sense 
view of children as irrational and morally pliable up to a fairly advanced point in their 
lives and, by default, of adolescence and youth as periods of accelerated politicisation 
and political turmoil. According to this developmental trajectory, children’s early 
political ideas are thought of as concrete and simplistic, with political awareness 
becoming stronger and more complex in adolescence and youth  (Braungart and 
Braungart 1986: 209). 
 
It has now become apparent that certain cognitive processes are indeed 
sequenced according to underlying neurological development. Even so, contemporary 
child development theorists have pointed to the many difficulties with the stage 
model. For example, research has shown that children in different cultures engage in 
complex moral reasoning much younger than this model imagines . Second, there is 
research indicating that far from exhibiting low levels of cognition and socio-moral 
reasoning, children who engage in terrorist-type political activities may be more 
intelligent, more socially outgoing and have higher educational achievements than 
those who do not (Cairns 1996). Third, if there is any basis to the bio-evolutionary 
argument about instinctual drives, then higher cognitive processes may be at best 
marginal or even entirely irrelevant to a discussion of children’s use of extreme 
violence on the battlefield where the survival instinct must surely play a significant 
role. In line with this kind of rationale, there are those who argue that emotions such 
as fear are so all-encompassing and powerful during combat that the more primitive 
forebrain simply takes over all other processes of the mind  . It is beyond my 
competence to judge the validity of these kinds of claims, but it does seem that far 
greater attention needs to be given to the effects of psycho-emotional functioning on 
thought and action in war, for this area of research is sorely neglected by many 
scholars of cognition (Allen 2005, Damasio 2000).  
 
Most important of all, though, there is overwhelming evidence that 
environmental forces are far more central to human cognition and behaviour than 
naturalist stage theorists have allowed for. The lack of analysis of the influence of 
factors like ideology, power relations, social identity and peer pressure, for example, 
becomes especially problematic when considering  youth  conduct on the battlefield 
(Schafer 2004). 
 
V. Causes and consequences: environmental influences 
Rejecting the idea that violence is an inherent feature of the human species, 
many researchers have set out to examine specific causes in specific individuals or 
groups. Factors such as personality, socialization, opportunity, or force are variously 
emphasised (Cairns 1996: 122). The bulk of this research has been conducted within 
psychology, with the resulting  limitation that  most analyses concern intra-psychic 
functioning and individual or interpersonal aggression rather than inter-group 
processes and their structural causes or collective manifestations. Indeed, some 
scholars do not make a clear distinction between these forms of violence, simply 
assuming that the incentives for individual aggression are the same as those for 
collective violence.  
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Although this review touches briefly on individual variables, the prime focus 
is on environmental and structural forces since these are in practice far more likely to 
be significant in determining young people’s engagement in inter-group conflict. For 
example, there has been much emphasis on the idea that young people’s involvement 
in violence may be the result of a failure of the early bonding process, but it is highly 
unlikely that this is a governing force in inter-group  hostilities (ibid: 120; Merkle 
1986).  There are very divergent ideas about how the environment influences 
behaviour. I n the more dynamic models mind and environment are regarded as 
interacting and mutually constituting, while in the more mechanistic accounts 
environmental forces appear to impact on the mind as in a one-way process. Overall 
three broad lines of reasoning can be discerned: one in which the environment of war 
acts as a stimulus to the mind and thereby to action; a second in which socio-cultural 
forces provide the lens through which worldviews and behaviours, including violent 
behaviours, are formed; and a third, which focuses on the interaction between 
oppressive structural forces and agentive beings.  
 
v.i. Environmental stimuli 
Psychological explanations that consider environmental factors to be an 
important influence in behaviour tend often to conceive of the environment as being 
made up of a series of stimuli that trigger violent reactions in humans.  There is 
commonly an implicit and unquestioned assumption in this literature that children are 
more susceptible to environmental stimuli than are adults, with some researchers 
highlighting personality type as a predisposing factor. It is not always clear what the 
assumption of susceptibility in children is based upon. Possible lines of reasoning 
might be that children’s internal control or self-regulatory mechanisms are less 
efficacious than adults’ and therefore their conduct is less likely to be consistent with 
expected standards of behaviour (Bandura 1986, 2001), that the techniques and agents 
of socialisation are insufficiently robust to inculcate peaceful values in children, or 
simply that children’s role models favour violence. 
 
Albert Bandura’s social learning theory (1973) and his ideas about 
psychological disorders in young humans, particularly in the context of behavior 
modification (Bandura 1969),  have provided what is possibly the single most 
influential explanation o f aggression within this tradition. Broadly informed by 
psychoanalysis, Bandura described human conduct in terms of a continuous reciprocal 
interaction between cognitive, behavioral, and environmental influences. He regarded 
aggression as being acquired through stimulus-response associations and 
observational learning, his thesis being that:  ‘most human behavior is learned 
observationally through modeling: from observing others one forms an idea of how 
new behaviors are performed, and on later occasions this coded information serves as 
a guide for action.’  (Bandura 1977: 22) In his view, observational learning of 
aggression occurs when children see others they admire behave aggressively and 
when such conduct is reinforced through the achievement of desired results. Hence, 
this theory suggests very strongly that children adopt political values and behaviours 
through imitation of others rather than through their own initiative, an idea that has 
received support in many quarters.  
 
Another way of thinking about environmental stimuli as a precursor to violence 
is through an emphasis on the psycho-emotional effects of environmental stressors. 
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interpretation, war is so pervasive, so overwhelming and so malevolent that it 
subsumes all other institutions, processes and agents of socialisation, with an indelible 
impact on young people’s thinking and action. As Sir Bryan Cartledge notes: 'The 
environment which the combatants have created is itself malign, inflicting death, 
injury, and intolerable levels of stress' (Cartledge 1995: 3). One argument is that such 
stress produces responses such as hyper-vigilance and emotional numbing which 
reduce children’s capability for empathising with others and thereby increases their 
readiness to commit atrocities (Dawes 2004). Debra Umberson, Kristis Williams and 
Kristin Anderson argue that ‘violence may be a component of emotional distress and 
that repressed emotion plays a role in triggering violent episodes’ (Underson, 
Williams and Anderson 2002: 191).  
 
Carol Ember and Melvin  Ember ( 1994) also postulate that violence is more 
likely among individuals who normally repress any emotional reaction to stress, 
adding that this tendency is particularly apparent in those who appraise situations as 
threatening. They suggest that some groups may be more likely to respond to stress 
with violence than others, offering up both socialization and situational factors as 
contributory. In their view, different social groups have different personal resources, 
roles and statuses that influence both the activation and experience of upset. Arguing 
from almost the opposite viewpoint, however,  Garbarino, Kostelny and Dubrow 
(1991) claim that, far from exhibiting heightened stress, young people are attracted to 
violence because they find moderate danger thrilling. Supporting this claim, Fraser 
(1974) sees children as being predisposed towards risk-taking because they are not 
capable psychologically of assessing the possible consequences of their actions.    
 
Favouring a very different explanatory model, social psychologist Ed Cairns 
(1996) warns that riots, demonstrations and war cannot logically be depicted as the 
consequence of  an aggregation of individual responses to environmental stimuli. 
Much  influenced by Henri Tajfel’s (1982) social identity theory of inter-group 
conflict, Cairns maintains that it is the collective nature of these actions that holds the 
key to young people’s political motivations and behaviour: 
Whether or not one thinks about, at one extreme, the adolescents in France who 
joined the Maquis (the French underground army) because it had ‘all the 
attractions of a great adventure’, of belonging to a secret society, of engaging 
young boys through their love of adventure and play and above all their team 
spirit … or of the gang-related activities of boys in Belfast in the 1970s … or the 
children in Palestine … the micro-social climate is probably the main factor in 
determining the sort of political response that children make.  (Cairns 1996: 114) 
 
Cairns envisions war not as a product of inter-personal factors and individual 
personality characteristics but of collective processes. He supports Tajfel’s theory that 
when humans operate as individuals they manifest attitudes and behaviours that are 
quite distinct from those associated with being in groups. Tajfel’s reasoning was that, 
confronted by a multiplicity of social stimuli, humans seek to make life more 
manageable by engaging in a continuous process of social categorisation, this process 
reducing the number of social categories they have to contend with. Essentially, these 
categories enable people to develop their social identity and sense of belonging—
people in different categories being perceived as more different than they actually are, 
with those of the same category appearing more similar. The thesis is that universally 
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is positively valued. This valuation is achieved by comparing their group with others, 
which in turn leads to as sense of ‘social psychological distinctiveness’.  
 
Personal identity, in other words, is hypothesised as only one element of self-
concept, with  individuals continuously striving to achieve positive social identity 
based on membership of groups. When individuals perceive themselves and others as 
members of groups it is their social and not their personal identity that is invoked. 
Hence, social identity becomes essential to how they think about both themselves and 
others. At the same time, choice of strategy for reinforcing positive social identity 
depends on the specific social and historical context. Conflict is a stronger possibility 
when  individuals become locked into groups that are not contributing to a positive 
evaluation of self and where, for historical and social structural reasons, it is not 
possible to change group membership. Similarly, violence is more likely where social 
groups disagree about the legitimacy of existing status positions and are able to make 
out alternatives to these positions. In this way, the social identity theory of conflict 
seems to presuppose a high level of awareness of social coherence within groups and 
of difference between adversaries.  
In order for large numbers of individuals to be able to hate or dislike or 
discriminate against other individuals seen as belonging to a common social 
category they first have acquired a sense of belonging to groups (or social 
categories) which are clearly distinct from and stand in certain relations to those 
they hate, dislike or discriminate against.  
(Tajfel 1978: 50, quoted in Cairns 1996: 7) 
 
This may well be the case in highly politicised environments such as the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories or South Africa during Apartheid rule. But it is not 
evident that this kind of analysis would rest well with the situations of mass violence 
that have occurred in other contexts, such as the rebel attack on Freetown in 1999 and 
the Lord’s Resistance Army’s (LRA) massacres in northern Uganda in recent years, in 
which group identity and solidarity were not necessarily very prominent. 
 
In terms of providing an explanation for a predisposition for conflict amongst 
the young, this theory would need to be able to account for youthful predilections for 
violent  social identities, as well as for youthful inclination towards aggressive 
strategies for sustaining these identities. If the nature assumption is to be disregarded, 
one would have to look for the specific historical and social factors that lead young 
people in certain contexts to challenge the legitimacy of existing power structures and 
groups. This kind of enquiry is customary within sociology and some anthropological 
accounts, with  the  research s uggesting that  group identity  and related collective 
behaviour among young people is frequently created and expressed through hostile 
and destructive youth subcultures that actively incite intergenerational conflict. 
 
v.ii. Socio-cultural processes 
Socialisation 
Anthropology and cultural psychology have a conception of how the 
environment shapes human thinking and behaviour that differs markedly from that 
based on stimulus responses. Within anthropology it has long been understood that 
the nature and meaning of adolescence and youth varies considerably across cultures. 
The  most established line of reasoning is that children and adolescents become 
aggressive through lengthy and conscious socialisation. Focusing on the socio-cultural QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS138  Page 16 
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antecedents for violence in the young, researchers in this tradition have sought to 
account for the forms of behaviour that fall within the normal range for a particular 
culture . The idea is that the socialisation process embodies specific regularities that 
engender in children particular behaviours, these behaviours being particularly valued 
in a given culture. The challenge in terms of the present review  is that the topic of 
extreme violence in the young has not been a major focus of this literature.   
 
Research in this vein generally attempts to delineate causal relations between 
specific features of the socialisation process and particular aspects of behaviour 
and/or to explore the use and legitimisation of violence in a given context. Margaret 
Mead (1935) was an early exponent of the idea that children in aggressive cultures 
become aggressive. She held that among the cannibalistic Mundugumor of eastern 
New Guinea parents would encourage children to be independent, combative and 
emotionally unresponsive to others. Napoleon Chagnon’s work with the Yanomamo 
Indians of Amazonia (1968; 1988) reinforced this proposition, his claim being that in 
this violent tribe homicide, blood revenge and war are commonplace, due to 
individual conflicts over natural or reproductive resources. Although he did not focus 
much on the process of socialisation, he did hold that the Yanomamo encourage their 
boys to be fierce (see also Peters, 1998; Turnbull, 1972).  The implication of these 
formulations is that certain cultures are inherently violent and have an inbuilt 
predisposition for war, a case that  has quite often  been  made for conflict-affected 
countries in Africa.  
 
But this position has proved quite controversial.  Ember and  Ember   for 
example take the view that war causes adults to socialise for aggression in children 
rather than aggressive socialisation being a cause of war-related violence. They reason 
that when people have a lot of war they need to produce courageous warriors and will 
socialise their sons to be aggressive. They find that socialisation for aggression is a 
very strong and significant predictor of homicide and assault, high rates of homicide 
thus being an inadvertent and unintended consequence of war.  In a similar vein, 
Kelley’s  research comparing the socialisation of child soldiers and child civilians in 
northern Uganda tests the hypothesis that the former are less ideally socialised to 
Acholi norms than the latter, this raising the possibility that militarization may result 
in diminished socialisation and a preference for violence. Through focus groups and 
interviews with Acholi adults she identifies five socialisation indicators: respect; 
responsibility; strong identity; collective ownership; and reconciliation. She finds that 
child soldering has had an expected deleterious effect on child socialisation in half of 
the indicators tested (collective ownership, responsibility and reconciliation). 
However, she calls for caution in interpreting these data, highlighting that this 
tendency might also be due to other stressors, especially the fear of being re-abducted 
by the  LRA and post-reintegration harassment. At the same time, she notes that 
civilian children also experienced many constraints to their socialisation associated 
with displacement, poverty and conflict, making it hard to attribute distortions in 
socialisation to war alone.  
 
It is possible to take the causal analysis of socialisation too far. Ronald Rohner 
(1976) warns of the need to be wary of making an  a priori assumption that a 
particular event or feature of the process of socialisation will lead to certain types of 
behaviour. He illustrates this by reminding that the ‘differential socialisation pressure’ 
hypothesis does not prove to be a very robust explanation of sex differences in QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS138  Page 17 
  17 
aggression, since males remain more aggressive than females even though different 
cultures approach the training of children very differently and some even encourage 
aggression in girls. He also dismisses the argument made by D’Andrade and Whiting 
(1966) that the gendered division of labour produces differences in aggression in 
males and females, citing research  which shows that even when boys do the same 
tasks as girls they remain more aggressive.  
 
Structural imperatives 
More recent ethnographic accounts of children in war tend to focus less on the 
process of socialisation and more on the ways in which social constructions of 
childhood and war and the social transitions of ageing predispose the young towards 
military action. One dominant theme in these analyses is the idea that the institution 
of war is not an aberration but somehow reinforces or replicates the ideational and 
structural forms that prevailed prior to its outbreak. In other words, as Murray Last 
(2005) has observed, there are social structures which make it easy for the young of a 
locality to act collectively in demonstrations, riots and other forms of rebellion.  
 
In this way, Richards (1996) emphasises how youthful recruits to the war in 
Sierra Leone were no strangers to violence. Street life had long been characterised by 
personal and political violence and thuggery was a prevalent form of post-colonial 
statecraft especially during the 1967-85 regime of Siaka Stevens. Susan Shepler   has 
also explored the idea that the child soldier is a historically meaningful category in 
that country, her case being that certain continuities of practice and discourse around 
children and childhood have rendered the notion of child soldiers intelligible in the 
local vernacular. She identifies child labour, fosterage, apprenticeship and induction 
into secret societies as the prime means through which these continuities have been 
expressed. Other studies on Africa have similarly explained how traditional ideas 
linking warfare with masculinity and initiation into adulthood provide a cultural 
foundation for the deployment of child soldiers in modern conflicts. Ellis (2005)  for 
example emphasises the role of secret societies in enhancing the power of children’s 
violence in Liberia. He maintains that ‘In many parts of West Africa, initiation 
societies have historically functioned as powerful agents of political and social 
incorporation, notably of young men who are most likely to be the warlike element in 
any society’ (ibid: 6). The particular appeal of military induction for the young is that 
it replicates rites of initiation into adulthood and is therefore perceived as a means of 
achieving adult status (ibid: 5). Ellis cites the Mouvement des forces démocratiques 
casamançaises (MFDC) in Senegal, the Karamajors in Sierra Leone, the Lofa Defense 
Force in Liberia, the Dozos in Côte d’Ivoire and the Bakassi Boys in Nigeria as 
examples of modern militias with a detectable background in traditional initiation 
societies or procedures. Likewise, among the Iteso in northern Uganda warfare has 
become a channel through which young men are able to become adults (de Berry 
2001). Years of cattle raiding by the Karamajong have decimated Iteso herds to the 
point that young males no longer have sufficient animals to pay bride price. Hence, 
they fight primarily in order to retrieve their cattle and so to be able to marry.  
 
Within e thno-theories of human development in Africa the young are 
sometimes framed as being especially well suited to warfare. The Iteso for example 
think of young males as stubborn and wild, stubbornness in their view being an 
important trait associated with soldiering (ibid). In Sierra Leone the advantages of 
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girls because they are more easily controlled. If you tell them to kill they will…. A 
child doesn’t have a wife, he doesn’t have children.’ ( 2004:  30). Among the 
gerontocratic Huasa of northern Nigeria the term for the young, ‘yara’, refers to all 
those who are dependent and of low status (Last 2005). Rebellion by young people is 
regarded as a premature attempt to move upward in status. The compulsion for 
children and adolescents to become violent may be especially acute in contexts where 
defence of family and community is a socially-acknowledged duty of the young. Last 
(2005), for example, describes how certain readings of Islam require young people to 
take power in the face of oppression.  
 
Cultural appropriation 
Whatever the congruities between  social expectations of young people and 
conflict and whatever the social justifications for violence, war undoubtedly causes 
profound social suffering and it cannot be supposed that it is within the capability or 
will of a culture to legitimate this kind of violence. The Iteso reacted strongly against 
the idea that past practices and beliefs provide a rationale for the devastation visited 
on their communities by Karamajong warriors in modern times. Besides, some violent 
episodes are truly inexplicable to both insiders and outsiders and simply defy cultural 
rationalization . This brings into play the idea of cultural appropriation that Jessica 
Schafer   employs in her study of young RENAMO combatants in Mozambique. 
Schafer writes about how, recognising that separation from family was a strong 
emotional wrench for their  young troops,  the  RENAMO commanders embraced 
Shona patriarchal imagery and the mantle of fictive kinship as a means of ‘re-
socialising’ their foot soldiers. The commanders cast themselves as fathers and their 
followers as children, with an associated incest taboo, and these filial ties bestowed 
new loyalties on the troops and a firm obligation to serve their masters 
unquestioningly on the battlefield.  
 
What is revealed in this case and in other war-affected societies is the way in 
which agents of war co-opt social and cultural templates, employing them in rites of 
military induction, codes of military conduct and the structuring of relations within 
the military unit. Cultural appropriation is used variously to isolate young foot 
soldiers from the civilian socio-moral domain, ensure their loyalty to and discipline 
within the troop, and incite them to undertake acts of exceptional bravery and 
brutality on the battlefield. Often cultural appropriation is rendered more effective by 
the deliberate perversion of civilian power relations, as occurred in Cambodia when 
the Khmer Rouge reformulated hierarchies based on age, gender, ethnicity and wealth 
as an explicit tactic for creating social and moral disorder. While the wealthy, the 
influential and the leaders of community were largely eliminated through torture, 
humiliation or assassination, children and adolescents gained command over many 
crucial aspects of life. Social engineering by the Khmer Rouge positioned children as 
soldiers, spies, leaders of the long marches and other adult roles that took them 
outside the moral boundaries of civilian society.  A similar logic is offered  as 
explanation of RUF activities in Liberia by Michael Jackson:  
The abduction of children by the RUF, and their adoption by rebel leaders—who 
were regarded as fathers, and called Pappy or Pa—recalls the initiatory seizure of 
children, whose ties with their parents are symbolically severed so that they can 
be reborn, in the bush, as men. This idea that war—like initiation, or play, or an 
adventure—is a moment out of time, spatially separated from the moral world, QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS138  Page 19 
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may also explain why many combatants anticipate a remorse-free return to 
civilian life (Jackson 2004:159 cited in Shepler 2004: 23) 
 
Supernatural powers and secular symbols 
Closely related to the concept of cultural appropriation is the idea that children 
may be rendered fearless and ferocious on the battlefield through the intervention of 
magic, spirits, adherence to cult practice, or some other exceptional mind-bending 
force, such a s hallucinogenic drugs (Zack-Williams  1999a). Researchers have 
identified two means by which this form of manipulation is enacted: through the 
claims of special  spiritual or magical powers made by military leaders; and through 
children and young people themselves being imbued with such powers. In some cases 
children who are thought to possess supernatural powers are considered better 
protected and more effective on the battlefield than adults. For example, among the 
Mano peoples in pre-colonial Liberia boy mascots protected by charms and medicines 
would apparently walk fearless and protected in front of warring parties .  And one of 
Shepler’s respondents indicated that:  
The young ones, ‘na den danger’ (they’re the most dangerous). In the RUF they 
performed the worst atrocities. In the CDF, sometimes the young ones are the 
most powerful witches. A lot of the CDF power comes from witch (magic) and 
sometimes young people are even stronger witches than old people.  
(Shepler 2004: 31)   
 
The conditions in northern Uganda have been rather different, for in this case 
it is the leadership that claims special powers. Alice Auma Lakwena, onetime leader 
of The Holy Spirit Movement, or the LRA, was possessed of several spirits and would 
perform healing rituals for her troops, many of whom were child abductees. She 
established ritual places called yards where she ‘prayed for her followers …and 
anointed them in oil, promising them that if they were pure, bullets would  not 
penetrate them’: 
She was able to cast out the cen, the dangerous and polluting spirits of those who 
had been killed by the soldiers and she loaded them with malaika, the Lwo term 
for angels. She also explained that war is a form of healing through which people 
would be purified. The healing is on both sides, as those that die are like the rotten 
flesh cut out by a surgeon. The pure, on the other hand, could not be killed.  
(Ibid: 14).  
LRA leaders appear to regard violence as a way of purging society of 
impurity. This sense of mission underpinning the war and the protection awarded to 
those young LRA fighters who remain pure supposedly sustains the extreme violence 
that has been an abiding feature of this conflict.
  
 
Secular symbols have been identified  as another important way in which 
children and adolescents are incited to violence during war. Often military leaders 
invoke globalised images of modernity, such as cult figures from the worlds of film or 
popular music, which are particularly attractive to the young. Richards (1996, 1999) 
talks about the ‘dramaturgy of social exclusion’ that RUF/SL commanders in Sierra 
Leone employed to galvanise their young troops into action. They played on the 
symbolism of the young misunderstood and socially excluded hero of the American 
film ‘First Blood’ (part of the Rambo trilogy) which had become extremely popular 
prior to the war. The particular appeal of the Rambo character was that he managed to 
triumph over a superior (adult) force through fearless bravery, cunning and QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS138  Page 20 
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resourcefulness. Richards notes the parallels between Rambo’s success at overcoming 
social rejection and the rejoicing of RUF/SL cadres at beating a numerically superior 
and better armed adult opponent ( Richards 1999: 7). The ‘Operation No Living 
Thing’ invasion of Freetown in January 1999 by young RUF fighters was inspired by 
the mythologised Tupac Shakur, the deceased American rap singer (Sommers 2003). 
The fighters wore Tupac shirts, wrote the lyrics of his songs on their vehicles and cut 
their hair according to his favoured style. ‘Drugged and brutalized, terrorized and 
truly terrifying, the rebel child and youth soldiers attacked Freetown residents. 
Amputations, rapes, and killings took place across the city’ (ibid: 9), resulting in the 
deaths of an estimated 6,000 people. 
 
v.iii. Structure and agency 
As the study of children through the process of socialization has diminished, 
so scholars in the social sciences have developed alternative paradigms. An increasing 
number of researchers in this field are working from a sociological or political 
economy perspective. They think of young people’s violence in war as a feature of the 
dynamic interaction between constraining structural conditions and collective human 
agency, these forces existing in an ongoing dialectical relationship. That is to say, 
youthful engagement in war is believed to be the consequence of structurally 
conditioned, motivated actions of volitional agents ‘employing such characteristically 
human attributes as intention, self-awareness, identification, representation and 
responsibility’ (Giddens 1984, Littlewood 1997: 7). 
 
This analysis entails consideration of the historical, social, economic and 
political conditions that generate rebellion, the structural position and circumstances 
of particular social categories—in this case the young, the ideational processes that 
produce a sense of collective consciousness and will for action and the precise 
motivation that underlay violent action specifically. Appreciation of the generational, 
life course and gendered differences between different cohorts of young people is also 
deemed necessary by some in order to understand the distinct opportunities and 
motives for fighting available to distinct social categories. ‘Structuralists argue that 
individuals in certain social groups … are exposed to greater strains that elicit 
violence. They also argue that certain groups are characterized by norms and values 
that emphasise violence as an acceptable way to express feeling and solve problems’ .  
 
Structuralist theories of conflict have become particularly influential in 
research on Africa. Two coexisting aspects of structure are highlighted: the first being 
the oppressive forces associated with failed post-colonial states and the economic and 
socio-political inequalities of globalisation; and the second, the opportunities brought 
about by poor governance and corruption on the one hand and by the promise of 
access to modern resources and the spread of modern technologies on the other. In 
Africa the increase in numbers of young people as a proportion of total population and 
their raised aspirations associated with the expansion of education and other trappings 
of modernity are juxtaposed with entrenched gerontocratic hierarchies and values, 
limited school places, low absorptive capacity of the job market, poor access to 
resources, high levels of forced migration and rapid rates of urbanisation. Maintaining 
not just that the young are marginalised socially, economically and politically, but that 
they have also developed a collective sense of this exclusion, discord, unrest and 
violent rebellion is explained as a conscious attempt to transform power structures and 
gain access to resources (Richards 1996, Sommers 2003, Zack-Williams 1999a). In QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS138  Page 21 
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other words, the case being made is that violence is motivated by outrage among the 
young arising from the severe constraints to their employment and power. 
 
Following this line, Zack-Williams (1999a, 1999b) frames his analysis of the 
violence of youth  in Sierra Leone in terms of a crisis ridden peripheral capitalist 
economy and the endeavours of the young to establish an alternative structure. In his 
view, external economic constraints, autocratic rule and economic mismanagement 
have all resulted in the growing alienation of large sections of the population, among 
whom unemployed school leavers and university graduates have figured significantly. 
‘In this way, the task of societal transformation became the preserve of the most 
alienated groups in society  – though not the most exploited – children and young 
people of the streets’ (Zack-Williams 1999b: 21).  
 
The groundswell of rebellion in many parts of Africa is perceived by Zack-
Williams as having been facilitated by  advances in weapons technology and the 
spread of armaments, the ready availability of small, light weapons having made it 
possible for children to fight. Other structural changes that he cites as significant are 
the de-professionalisation and mobility of the armed forces in modern intra-state 
conflicts which similarly enhance the role of the young. In his analysis Richards 
focuses on the intervention of foreign companies involved in minerals extraction in 
enclave economies, h ighlighting how they have incited the violence through the 
deployment of private armies and the creation of diamond camps which have become 
inhabited by chronically homeless, ‘footloose’ young diggers with only a precarious 
hold on employment. 
 
Picking up  on similar themes, Sommers talks about young people being 
‘empowered through alienation’ . 
In this context, then, it can hardly be surprising that impoverished, unskilled, and 
poorly educated urben youth often recast themselves as heroic underdogs. Rather 
than accepting their sidelined social existence, many celebrate it. This is an 
indication not only of the resilience of urban youth but of their distance from 
those seeking to stabilise and develop African cities.  (Sommers 2003: 8) 
 
Sommers describes how throughout Tanzania young people speak what has 
become known as the ‘language of the ignorant’: ‘What is called a language …is an 
ever-changing vocabulary of words that Tanzanian youth use to confer their 
connection to Bongoland (Literally “Brainland”, the nickname for Dar es Salaam) and 
their separation from elite society’ (ibid: 8). This language is used by many urban 
youth to describe how they see themselves: as alienated outcasts. 
 
Of the literatures considered in this review, this is the one that focuses most 
explicitly on the notion of children and adolescents as social actors who are engaged 
in conscious, intentional actions. It is also the literature that yields the most dynamic 
view of children in war and focuses most consistently on the motivation for collective 
as opposed to individual action. It provides an analysis of the particular historical, 
political and economic conditions that underpin young people’s rebellions, and 
locates their political activism in the broader context of globalisation of power and 
economy.  What is not so clear is whether the thesis of youthful rebellion as a product 
of generational alienation in the context of highly constrictive structures would 
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Conclusion 
Many adults have very real reasons to fear the young and it is important to 
acknowledge that in war children and adolescents sometimes commit far greater 
atrocities than do adults. Large numbers of young people with guns undoubtedly do 
have the power to challenge adult authority and adult society, but in many cases the 
moral panic incited by young people is wholly disproportionate to the threat they 
pose. In modern times, in a climate of anxiety about world terrorism and insurrection, 
violence perpetrated by young people visits a sense of foreboding as never before. 
Although systematic comparative research on this issue remains to be done, this brief 
review suggests that it is not only in Europe and North America that social definitions 
of childhood and adolescence tend to preclude engagement in violence, whether inter-
personal or political. As a consequence it would seem that in many contexts young 
people who fight enter a social condition that denigrates the accepted status of 
childhood and adolescence.  In this way, young combatants are problematised by 
adults and excluded from the category of child or adolescent as anomalous and 
threatening to the socio-moral order.  
 
As youthful aggression becomes increasingly implicated in both rebellions 
against states and international terrorism, so mounting energy is being invested in the 
effort to make comprehensible young people’s predisposition for violence during war. 
Yet the debate is often based on misperception and much of it is sensationalised. A 
great deal more research remains to be done in order for a more informed dialogue to 
emerge. Possibly because of personal sensibilities, ethical concerns or a profound 
reluctance to think the unthinkable, not many of the researchers who study war have 
taken  on board the idea that children  and adolescents  may be more violent than 
adults—there having been far less analysis of the nature of  young people’s political 
violence than of recruitment practices and motives for child enlistment. A first step 
therefore would be to study this issue directly, taking into account the importance of 
situating the experiences and conceptions of childhood and adolescence within the 
wider economic and socio-political context in which violence occurs. 
 
At the present time most theories of causality in young people’s conduct 
appear to rest on only one  form of influence on human  development and action, 
whether an aspect of the environment, personal experience, or individual traits. Most 
of the existing theories have failed to do justice to the full complexity of human 
motivation and the forces that mediate this. A complete account needs to give due 
attention to the influence and interaction of experiential, environmental and 
biogenetic factors, exploring their cognitive, psycho-emotional and behavioural 
effects. Whereas consideration of biological and genetic predisposition might stress a 
mix of basic instinctual drives, adaptive evolutionary mechanisms and personal 
heritage, discussions of the mediating influence of experience might highlight 
starvation, fear of being killed, desire for revenge or other motivational forces. 
Discussion of environmental features might focus on collective values that increase 
racism and racial prejudice, marginalise the young and endorse cruelty, or structural 
constraints such as compulsion, lack of alternative economic or survival choices, or 
social power. However, here we confront major challenges due to the practical 
difficulties of researching communities in conflict, epistemological barriers and 
disciplinary predilections, all of which have conspired to polarise the discussion and 
produce serious gaps in empirical knowledge and theory.  
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Among the gaps that are most consequential is the failure of research on 
children in war to take account of the many  advances made in recent years in 
neuroscience, cognitive science and the social sciences generally. A review of the 
literatures in these disciplines should yield greater understanding of how young 
people think and feel, the manner in which they acquire those ways of thinking and 
those feelings and the relationship of such knowledge and such emotions to 
environment, experience and action (Gauvain 2001, Siegler 2001). By the same token, 
mainstream research on cognition and development in humans seldom takes account 
of power relations, conflict or the extremes of human experience generally, and 
normally implies high levels of consensus and coherence of values, behaviours and 
social relations. Greater consideration of the full diversity of  young people’s 
lifeworlds, including lifeworlds marked by violence and political strife, is needed in 
all research on the young.  
 
Finally, much of the analysis so far has infantilised the young as mere 
receptors of environmental stimuli or of adult ideas and culture, often disregarding the 
highly complex and dynamic processes involved in cognition and behaviour. As 
Lawrence Hirschfeld (2002) highlights with regard to anthropology, there is a 
tendency to resist the study of internal states and to devise a plausible theory of how 
individuals mediate learning. This criticism could also be levied with equal validity at 
sociology, political economy and other related disciplines. Hirschfeld (2002: 615) 
emphasises that children do not just learn by mimicking but acquire culture, represent 
cultural information and manipulate these representations and use them to make sense 
of the world and organize action in it. In other words, the child novice is expert at 
learning. Psychology on the other hand falls down on its tendency to de-politicise and 
de-contextualise childhood and adolescence to the point where the historical, cultural 
and socio-political bases of their rebellions are rendered invisible. Psychology does 
have a view of children as constructive agents and yet, like anthropology, when it 
comes to consideration of children in war all too often has children and adolescents 
acting instinctively, reacting against, or responding to, rather than actively doing, 
constructing, representing, or overcoming extremes of environment and experience. In 
order to stem the tide of moral panic about the young or at least to account more 
effectively for their behaviour, we need far more effective theories and evidence than 
at present on children’s and adolescent’s actions in war, theories that take account of 
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